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THE NEW ACTIVIST COURT
DONALD H. ZEIGLER*
INTRODUCTION
The New York Times recently charged that "[r]adical change is
underway at the Supreme Court"' As the 1994-95 Term ended, The
Times accused the Court of "toppling doctrines and precedents that
had held for decades," while displaying "a disrespect [for Congress]
bordering on contempt."2 Linda Greenhouse, The Times legal
commentator, supported the attack in a separate article:
An ascendant bloc of three conservative justices with an appetite for
fundamental, even radical change drove the Court on a re-examina-
tion of basic Constitutional principles. Long-held assumptions
about the authority of the national government, the relationship
between Washington and the states, and the ability of the Federal
Government to take race into account in making public policy were
all placed on the table for dissection. Some precedents were
overruled, others sharply limited in a gaudy show of zero-based
jurisprudence.'
The popular press is finally recognizing what those who watch the
Court closely have known for some time: the current Court is very
activist, perhaps as activist as the Warren Court in its heyday.
Judicial activism means different things to different people. As
Justice Ginsburg stated during her confirmation hearings, judicial
activism is "a label too often pressed into service by critics of court
* Professor of Law, New York Law SchooL A.B., 1966, Amherst Co!!e;J.D. 1969, Columbia
University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Brian Fortune.
1. A Court Running in the Wrong Direction, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995, at A20 (editorial).
2. Id The New York Times renewed its charges as the new Term began on October 2, 1995,
accusing the "revisionists ... [of] embark[ing] on a course of judicial activism that closely
parallels the rethinking of the social contract taking place across the street in the new Republi-
can Congress." High Court Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at A16 (editorial).
3. Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court: The Right Goes Activist and the
Center Is a Void, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1.
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results rather than the legitimacy of court decisions."4 When most
people use the phrase, however, they are referring to how a court
decides cases. They are talking about process more than result.
Critics charge that activist judges violate separation of powers
principles by assuming legislative or executive functions.5 President
Reagan, who nominated Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia, said
he wanted to appoint justices "who understand the danger of short-
circuiting the electoral process and disenfranchising the people
through judicial activism."6 He went on to state that our Founding
Fathers "never intended ... that the courts preempt legislative
prerogatives."7 President Bush, who nominated Justices Souter and
Thomas, echoed this theme: "Judge Souter is committed to interpret-
ing, not making the law... I have selected a person who will ...
not legislate from the Federal bench."'
4. Rorie Sherman & Claudia MacLachlan, Congress OKs MoneyforJurors and Lawyers, NAT'L
LJ., July 19, 1993, at 29. Ginsburg elaborated on this point in response to questions from
Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ). See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be AssociateJustlice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 169-71 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearings] (testimony of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg) (observing that necessity sometimes requires courts to give legislative remedies).
Senator Hatch's comments on judicial activism during the hearings show a plain concern with
the results of court decisions.
IJludicial activism has resulted in the elevation of the rights of criminals and criminal
suspects and the concomitant strengthening of the criminal forces against the police
forces of our country, the twisting of the constitutional and statutory guarantees of
equal protection of the law such that reverse discrimination often results; prayer being
chased out of the schools; and the Court's creating out of thin air a constitutional right
to abortion on demand, to just cite a few instances ....
Id. at 6 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
5. Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Sen. Specter); 137 CONG. REC.
S14,311 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
6. Bernard Weinraub, Reagan Says He'll Use Vacancies to Discourage Judicial Activism, N.Y.
TimES, Oct. 22, 1985, at Al.
7.- Id. Members of President Reagan's administration echoed this theme. Presidential
spokesman Larry Speakes stated that a court "appointee must agree that the 'role of the court
is to interpret the law, not enact new law by judicial fiat.'" Julia Malone, Reagan Can Tip Supreme
Court Scale to Right CHRISrIAN SCL MONrrOR, June 19, 1981, at 1. Attorney General William
French Smith "accused unelectedjudges of substituting their own policy preferences for the
determinations of the public's elected representatives." Bill Peterson, In the Administration, a
Pattern Develops on Conservatives'Agenda, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1982, atA2. Presidential counselor
Edwin Meese said that the President wanted to appoint judges who "have a sense of judicial
restraint.... We want people to be judges, not legislators." Reagan'sJudicialAppointments: How
Much Impact?, PR Newswire, Nov. 1, 1982, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
8. Comments by the President on His Choice of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at A18
(editorial).
Senator DeConcini presented an interesting variation on this theme duringJustice Ginsburg's
confirmation hearings. He found Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation to be
activist:
Justice Scalia is a proponent of so-called textualism. He attempts to limit the statutory
interpretation to the text and ignores the legislative history. He does not look at
committee reports, he does not look at congressional debate. Rather, he has decided
he will just look at the statute to determine congressional intent.... [Clongressional
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Although thejudiciary has primary responsibility for saying what the
Constitution means, judges are considered activist when they
articulate new constitutional rights not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution,9 or when they overturn statutes based on their own
readings of constitutional values.1° Judges are likewise considered
activist when they stretch or loosen doctrines designed to ensure that
cases are properly before them for review, such as the doctrines of
standing, mootness, and ripeness, or the final judgment rule."
Finally, judges are considered activist when they ignore, distort, or
overrule prior precedent. 2
This Article contends that the Rehnquist Court is activist in all of
these ways. Support for this contention is developed by analyzing
three recent Supreme Court cases that dramatically demonstrate the
Court's activism. The cases are Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,' which reinterprets the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,14 which creates a new federal
common law defense for military contractors, and United States v.
Lopez," which voids a federal criminal statute because it exceeded
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
legislative history is not always clear, I am very cognizant of that, but I believe ignoring
it per se is a form ofjudicial activism ....
Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 4, at 325 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
9. A.E. Dick Howard, ChiefEnigma, A.BAJ., Oct. 1995, at 67. Senator Hatch pushed this
point to its logical extreme during the hearings on the nomination of Justice Ginsburg. In
Senator Hatch's view, the role of the judicial branch "is to enforce the provisions of the
Constitution ... as their meaning was originally intended by the Framers." Ginsburg Hearings,
supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
10. Howard, supra note 9, at 67; William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces ofJudicial Activism,
Address Before the George Washington University National Law Center (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61
GEO. WASH. L REv. 1, 2 (1992).
11. See, eg., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476-87 (1975) (relaxing
requirement that only final judgments may be appealed); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25
(1973) (finding exception to rule against hearing moot cases so that abortion cases might reach
appellate courts); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,504-05 (1972) (grantingwhite petitioners standing
to challenge systematic exclusion of blacks from juries). Some commentators also consider it
activist when the Court declines to hear cases properly assigned to it by Congress. See generally
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE
LJ. 71 (1984) (contending that abstention doctrines ignore dictates of validjurisdictional and
civil rights statutes and thus usurp legislative authority in violation of separation of powers
principles).
12. See Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions ofJudicial Activism, 66JUDICATURE 236,241
(1983) (listing interpretive stability, "the degree to which a Supreme Court decision either
retains or abandons precedent or existingjudicial doctrine," as measure ofjudicial activism); see
also Christopher E. Smith & Avis AlexandriaJones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism and the Risk of
Injustice, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 53, 58 (1993) (describing one dimension ofjudicial activism as "'a
judicial decision that substitutes judicial policy for the policy of elected branches of
government'" (quoting HENRY GucK, COURTS, PoLirrcs, AND JUSTICE 309 (2d ed. 1988))).
13. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
14. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
15. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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Although these decisions are from very different areas of the law, they
all exemplify the current judicial activism.
These cases were chosen for several reasons. First, they each
involve important legal subjects. If the Justices continue farther down
the new paths they have mapped, the changes will be profound and
far-reaching. Second, the cases together present examples of the
techniques ofjudicial activism outlined above. They demonstrate the
process ofjudicial activism in all of its facets. Finally, the cases involve
different areas of the law, which shows that the Court's new activism
is broad-based.16
I. LuCAs v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council is an activist decision because
the Court created a new rule of law. In the process, it badly distorted
precedent. The Court also reached out to hear the case even though
it may not have been ripe for review. Lucas signaled a major change
in takings law. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion states, "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." 7 Lucas creates a new categorical rule:
any regulation of property that eliminates all of its viable economic
use is a per se taking, unless the proscribed use was not a part of the
owner's title to begin with.' The Court also invites the lower courts
to define the relevant parcel of land so as to make it easier to find a
compensable total taking.' 9 Lucas suggests that courts consider a
partial restriction of an owner's rights to be a total taking of the part
restricted, thus requiring compensation in many more cases than in
the past." Lucas tips the balance in favor of property owners and
against government by making it more difficult and expensive to
regulate land use.
The stakes hardly could be higher. Using the police power,
government at all levels routinely regulates property to protect the
citizenry from harm and to promote the public health and safety.
Regulations that restrict the use of property often diminish its value.
Justice Holmes once remarked, "Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
16. This Article does not mean to suggest that judicial activism is either good or bad per
se, nor does the author present his own views about the underlying merits of the cases. The
Article simply seeks to demonstrate that the Rehnquist Court is very activist.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
19. See id at 1016 n.7 (avoiding answering question of what constitutes relevant parcel of
land and thus leaving question open for lower court to decide).
20. See id.; see also infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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without paying for every such change in the general law."" On the
other hand, government's power to take property without compensa-
tion must have some limits. Making an individual bear the entire cost
of a public benefit is often unfair.22 If extended too far, the police
power could wholly extinguish private property rights.'u
The Supreme Court has struggled mightily for over a century to
achieve a proper balance between the competing public and private
interests. As Justice Brennan remarked in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,24 "what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable
difficulty."' Early takings cases strongly favored the government.
Historically, the Takings Clause required compensation only if
government directly appropriated property,2 6  or, as a practical
matter, took possessionY.2  As the Court explained in Mugler v.
Kansas,28  "[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense,
be deemed a taking or appropriation of property."29 The Court
found no taking even when the prohibition on the property's use
made it worthless, or very nearly so.
30
21. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
22. SeeArmstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (stating that "Fifth Amendment's
guarantee... [was] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
23. Pennsylvania Coa4 260 U.S. at 415 (explaining that although Fifth Amendment is
"qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disappears"). For a thoughtful
discussion of some of the larger issues underlying takings cases and a brief review of the relevant
literature, see EVA H. HANKS ET AL, ELEMENTS OF I.Aw 200-19 (1994).
24. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
26. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1870) (interpreting Fifth
Amendment "as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries
resulting from the exercise of lawful power").
27. See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (finding that government
actions restricting private property use do not constitute taking whereas physical invasion of real
estate that is in effect "a practical ouster of [private owner's] possession" is taking).
28. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
29. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (emphasis added). In Mugler, a Kansas
distiller sought compensation after an amendment to the state constitution made it illegal to
manufacture and sell alcoholic beverages. Id. at 637. The Court denied relief, even though the
plaintiff had built his brewery before the amendment. Id. at 625, 675; see also Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408-10 (1915) (refusing to provide compensation when municipality
passed ordinance prohibiting plaintiff from operating his brick mill within city limits).
30. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657 (refusing compensation despite fact that "buildings and
machinery constituting these breweries are of little value" because of state constitutional
amendment); see also Hadacdeck, 239 U.S. at 408-10 (affirming lower court's decision to refuse
compensation despite fact that land was more valuable for brickmaking than for any other
purpose).
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In 1922, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon3l significantly changed
takings law by adopting a balancing test that was heavily dependant
on the facts of each case. 2 In Mahon, the plaintiffs bought their
home from the Pennsylvania Coal Company.33 The deed expressly
reserved to the company the right to remove coal under the property,
and stated that the grantee waived any claim to damages that might
occur in the process.'M When Pennsylvania passed a statute forbid-
ding mining coal in a way that caused the subsidence, or sinking, of
surface land under homes, the Mahons sought to enjoin the company
from mining under their property.35 The state supreme court held
that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power and
denied the company any compensation." The United States
Supreme Court reversed. 7
The Court's new balancing test weighed public and private interests
on an ad hoc basis:
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due
process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determin-
ing such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
So the question depends upon the particular facts.
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change .... [T]his is a question of degree-and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. 38
These vague and flexible standards obviously have allowed the Court
great leeway in deciding takings cases.3 9 In Mahon, Justice Holmes
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
33. Id. at 412.
34. Id.
35. Id (asserting that Kohler Act removed coal company's rights to mine coal on plaintiffs'
property).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 416.
38. Id. at 413, 415-16.
39. SeeBRUCEAcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTYAND THE CONSTITUTION 165 (1977) (observing
howJustice Holmes' ad hoc approach allowed judges to reach decisions different than his own
in Mahon).
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chose to characterize the coal company's loss as very great." He
minimized the public interest by saying, "This is the case of a single
private house. ... The damage is not common or public."4 '
Holmes made no mention of the obvious public interest in having the
surface of Pennsylvania remain at ground level rather than sinking by
stages into the abyss. Instead, he concluded that when individuals
and communities acquire only surface rights to property, they should
not be entitled to "greater rights than they bought."42
The Supreme Court followed the general standards announced in
Mahon for the next seventy years.4 In case after case, the Court
reaffirmed that no precise rule or test could be formulated.1
Instead, it decided takings issues by weighing the public and private
interests on a case-by-case basis. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, the Court listed several factors to weigh:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interfer-
ence with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.45
in Mahon).
40. Pennsylvania Coa4 260 U.S. at 414.
41. Id. at 413.
42. i at 416.
43. SeeAcKERmAN, supra note 39, at 236 n.9 (observing in 1977 that "[t] he Court had made
no important doctrinal advance since Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon").
44. See, eg., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295
(1981) ("[Tlhis Court has generally been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
[takings issues]." (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979))); Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) ("[N]o precise rule determines when property has been
taken .... "); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("There is no set formula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins."); United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a
particular governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a question
properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case."); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) ("The inie which in this field separates the legitimate from the
illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with
circumstances and conditions.").
45. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted);
see also Hod, 452 U.S. at 295 (identifying significant factors "'such as impact of the regulation,
its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the
government action'" that are considered when examining "taking" issues (quoting Kaiser, 444
U.S. at 175)); Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 ("[IThe question necessarily requires a weighing of private
and public interests."); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 ("[A] comparison of values before and after
is relevant, [but] is by no means conclusive.") (citations omitted).
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The prevailing standards thus were firmly established, and served
tolerably well for at least two generations.
The Court made only one exception to its ad hoc, interest-
balancing approach. In Loretto v. Teleprmpter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,4" the Supreme Court held that permanent physical occupation
of property should be deemed a taking "without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner."47 The Court said it had invariably
found a taking when owners suffered "permanent physical occupa-
tion" of their property.48 It distinguished temporary physical
invasions, which are subject to the general balancing test, from
permanent physical occupation of property, which merits relief
without applying the balancing test.49
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council5" Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices
White, O'Connor, and Thomas.5 Justice Scalia began by reviewing
the facts. In 1986, David H. Lucas bought two beachfront lots on an
island off the coast of South Carolina where he planned to build
single-family homes.52 When he bought the property, it was not
within a "critical area" under South Carolina's Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, and thus no special permits were required to build."3 In
1988, however, South Carolina amended the Act to prohibit erection
of "occupiable improvements" on additional beachfront areas, which
included Lucas' lots.5 4 Lucas sued in state court, claiming that the
construction bar constituted a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." The trial court agreed, finding that the prohibition
"'deprive [d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots.., and
46. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
47. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
48. Id at 427-35.
49. See id. at 432 (concluding that balancing test is applicable to physical invasions but not
to permanent physical occupation). In Penn Central, the Court stated: "A 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government...." Penn Central 438 U.S. at 124. The phrase "may more readily be found"
suggests that a taking might not be found in some circumstances.
50. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
51. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992). Justice Kennedy
filed an opinion concurring in thejudgment Id. at 1032 (KennedyJ, concurring). Justices
Blackmun and Stevens each filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 1036, 1061. Justice Souter filed a
separate statement. I&. at 1076.
52. Id. at 1008.
53. Id.
54. Id at 1008-09.
55. Id. at 1009.
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render[ed] them valueless."'56 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed.57 It held that the government owed no compensation
under the Takings Clause because the legislation was designed to
prevent serious public harm to South Carolina's coastal zone.5
Justice Scalia began his discussion of takings law59 by noting that
the Court had "generally eschewed any 'set formula"' for determining
takings questions, preferring instead to engage in "essentially ad hoc
factual inquiries."'  Justice Scalia then announced the new categori-
cal rule, although he attempted to mask it by asserting that he was
merely reaffirming standards set in earlier cases:
We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of
regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into
56. Id. (quoting appendix to petition for certiorari at 37). The majority's eagerness to
make new law is highlighted by their uncritical acceptance of this erroneous factual finding. As
Justice Blackmun points out in his dissenting opinion, Lucas retained many rights of ownership,
such as the right to exclude others from his property and the right to picnic, swim, camp, or live
on the property in a movable trailer. I. at 1044 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). He might also have
been able to sell it to adjoining owners wishing to insure an unobstructed view of the water. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (doubting that land
is valueless based on fact that Lucas still had "other uses" for land available to him). The
defendant argued in its brief on the merits that the trial court finding was erroneous, but the
majority refused to consider the argument because the defendant had failed to raise the
challenge in its Brief in Opposition to Lucas' petition for certiorari. I& at 1020 n.9. While the
Court has the power to decide a case based on an erroneous finding, id. at 1045 (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting), it also has the power to refuse to accept findings by state courts that are clearly
erroneous. See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 23 (1920) (disregarding state court finding
and facts set forth in petition that payment of taxes by Indians was voluntary and basing its
decision on fact that payment was compelled).
57. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 902 (S.C. 1991).
58. Id. at 900-02.
59. As a threshold matter, the Court addressed whether the case was ripe for review. Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-14 (1992). The Court's treatment of this
issue again demonstrates how eager it was to reach the merits and make new law. In 1990, after
the case was argued in the South Carolina Supreme Court, but before it was decided, South
Carolina amended the applicable statute to allow special permits for construction of habitable
structures on previously restricted land. Id. at 1010-11. The South Carolina Supreme Court,
however, did not rest its decision on ripeness grounds. Id. at 1011-13. Thus, while Lucas
remained free to apply for a special permit for future construction, he was denied any further
opportunity to make a takings claim for the past deprivation occurring from 1988, when
building was first restricted, to 1990, when the special permit procedure was adopted. Id. at
1011. Because the Court had previously held that temporary deprivations of use may be
compensable under the Takings Clause, seeFirst English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987), the majority concluded that Lucas' claim for past
deprivation was ripe for review. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012.
While the Court technically is correct, it plainly is stretching to hear this case. As Justice
Stevens notes in his dissenting opinion, it is not even clear that Lucas suffered any temporary
deprivation from 1988 to 1990 because the record does not reveal if he actually planned to build
during that period. Id. at 1062 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Given the lack of ripeness of Lucas'
permanent takings claim, and the uncertainty of the record as to the temporary takings claim,
the Court easily could have avoided reaching the merits. Indeed, Justice Stevens accuses the
Court of "[c]avalierly dismissing the doctrine ofjudiclal restraint." Id. at 1062 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
60. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
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the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first
encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to suffer
a physical "invasion" of his property. In general (at least with
regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind
it, we have required compensation....
The second situation in which we have found categorical
treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land. As we have said on numerous
occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regula-
tion "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."6
Justice Scalia correctly asserts that permanent physical invasions or
occupation of property are takings per se.62  But categorical treat-
ment has never been accorded when regulation denies all economical-
ly viable use of land, and the cases he cites simply do not support that
proposition. Justice Scalia builds his argument on one sentence from
Agins v. TiburonP that is repeated in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,' Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,65 and
Hodel v. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.66 Justice Scalia's reason-
ing is weak for several reasons. First, the sentence he relies on is
dicta. Second, on close examination, the sentence does not quite
make sense. Third, Justice Scalia takes the sentence completely out
of context. Far from establishing a categorical rule, Agins is the
quintessential balancing case.6 7
The plaintiffs in Agins acquired five acres of unimproved land in
the city of Tiburon, California.' Subsequently, the city adopted
zoning ordinances that limited development of the property.69 The
plaintiffs filed suit in state court claiming that the ordinances were
facially unconstitutional, and that the city had completely destroyed
the value of their property." The city demurred, and the trial court
61. Id. (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
62. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (noting that permanent physical invasions
constitute per se takings).
63. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The sentence Justice Scalia relies on is: "The application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance state interests... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land .... " Id. at
260 (citations omitted).
64. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
65. 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
66. 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981).
67. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
68. Id. at 257.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 258.
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sustained the demurrer.7' The California Supreme Court af-
firmed,72 and explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the ordi-
nances completely destroyed the value of the property because the
ordinances by their terms permitted construction of from one to five
residences on the tract.73
The sentence Justice Scalia relies upon appears near the beginning
of Agins' discussion of takings law. It reads: "The application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."7 4  The
sentence clearly is dicta, because, as noted above, the ordinances did
not deprive the plaintiffs of all economically viable use of their land.
The plaintiffs were still allowed to build some houses on the parcel.75
More importantly, the sentence makes little sense. It makes more
sense if the "or" is changed to "and," which may be what Justice
Powell, who wrote Agins, meant to say. With that change, the
sentence would suggest that both public and private interests should
be considered. As actually worded, however, one can read the
sentence to mean that a regulation effects a taking if either of the
conditions mentioned is satisfied. That is, a regulation effects a
taking if it does not advance a legitimate state interest, or if it denies
an owner economically viable use of his land. Justice Scalia interprets
the sentence this way-or at least he says a taking occurs if the second
condition is satisfied; that is, if the regulation deprives the owner of
economically viable use of his land.76 But what if the first condition
is satisfied and not the second? What if a regulation advances no
state interest, but costs a landowner little or nothing at all? Is that a
taking? Clearly not. The sentence makes more sense if one
substitutes "and" for "or." One may reasonably find a taking if the
ordinance does not advance an important state interest and it
significantly restricts ownership rights.
77
71. Id,
72. I&
73. rd at 259 n.6. Although the case was decided by demurrer and thus without evidence
being submitted, California law allows a court to reject allegations in a complaint if they are
contrary to a law of which the court may take judicial notice. XL The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' allegations because they were inconsistent with the terms of the ordinance. Id.
74. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
75. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
76. Because the rule is absolute according to justice Scalia, presumably a taking occurs even
if the regulation advances criticalstate interests. And indeed, this was ciearly the case in Lucas.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992) (explaining that land
that qualified as "critical area" was not immune from Fifth Amendment taking).
77. Interestingly, Justice Scalia has in the past used "and" rather than "or" to connect the
two conditions. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) ("We have
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Justice Scalia also takes the Agins sentence completely out of its
context. The sentence is the topic sentence of a paragraph that
reaffirms the traditional rule that courts decide takings cases by an ad
hoc balancing of public and private interests, not by a mechanical,
single factor analysis.7' Following the topic sentence, the paragraph
continues:
The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is,
in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a
single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power
in the public interest. Although no precise rule determines when
property has been taken, the question necessarily requires a
weighing of private and public interests. The seminal decision in
Euclid v. Ambler Co. is illustrative. In that case, the landowner
challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that
restricted commercial development of his property. Despite alleged
diminution in value of the owner's land, the Court held that the
zoning laws were facially constitutional. They bore a substantial
relationship to the public welfare, and their enactment inflicted no
irreparable injury upon the landowner.79
In the remaining paragraphs of Agins, Justice Powell weighs
California's interest in preserving open space in residential neighbor-
hoods against the plaintiff's interest in obtaining maximum profit
from development of the land." The Court concludes that because
California's interest is an important one, and the plaintiff may still
build on the land, no taking has occurred."' Thus, read as a whole,
Agins is a classic example of the Court's cautious, ad hoc balancing
approach to takings issues. Justice Scalia badly distorts the case by
citing it as the source of a categorical rule. 2
The other cases cited by Justice Scalia similarly fail to establish a
categorical rule. All of the cases quote the language from Agins, but
in none did the regulations deprive the owners of all economically
long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance [s]
legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land'"
(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)) (emphasis added). Agins states what effects a taking; Nollan
states what does not. Perhaps the need for "and" rather than "or" between the two conditions
was more apparent tojustice Scalia when the proposition was stated negatively in Nollan. Again,
it does not make much sense to say that a regulation does not effect a taking if it denies some
but not all economic use of land but serves no legitimate government purpose. ChiefJustice
Rehnquist recently repeated the conjunctive formulation in Dolan v. City of Tigard. See 114 S.
C. 2309, 2316-17 (1994) (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
78. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
79. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
80. See id. at 261.
81. Id at 261-62.
82. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992).
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viable use of their land.83 Thus, the language continued to be dicta.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission is very far afield because it
actually involved the first rather than the second of the Agins
conditions. In Nollan, the Court found a taking because the regula-
tion did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.84 The
Court held that there was not a sufficient relationship, or nexus,
between the goal of the regulation and the means chosen to
accomplish the goal. 5
Keystone and Hodel both involved unsuccessful facial challenges to
regulations restricting coal mining. Thus, neither case considered the
effect of the regulations on a specific piece of property. Keystone
explicitly relied on the balancing test of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, and quoted the Agins language in a paragraph that weighed
the public interest against the private cost to coal companies.8 6 The
Court's discussion of the two factors suggests that the factors do not
operate independently. The Court specifically reaffirmed several early
cases where the taking was total or near total, but no constitutional
violation was found because the state had a particularly strong interest
in regulating the activity.8 7 Hodel rejected the takings claim in
cursory fashion. The Court seemed irked that the coal companies
had made a facial challenge, which "ignored this Court's oft-repeated
admonition that the constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided
except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision
83. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins as
source of denial of all economically viable use test); Keystone, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987) (finding
that enactment of Surface Mining Act did not make it commercially impracticable to continue
mining bituminous coal); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Redamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
295-96 (1981) (finding the Surface Mining Act does not categorically deny an owner from
mining surface coal).
84. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
85. I& at 837-39. The California Coastal Commission conditioned the plaintiffs' right to
build a new beachfront house on the plaintiffs granting the public an easement to walk across
plaintiffs' beach. Id. at 828. The Commission thought that the new house would block the view
of the ocean, and thus contribute to a "'wall' of residential structures" that would psychologically
prevent the public from recognizing that a stretch of coastline existed nearby. Id. ButJustice
Scalia found it "quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the
beach created by the new house... [or] lowers any 'psychological barrier' to using the public
beaches." Id. at 838.
The Court also concluded that the easement was a "permanent physical occupation" of the
property that should automatically be considered a taking under the rule ofLoretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp. Id. at 831-32; see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (explaining
that permanent physical invasion is per se taking).
86. Keystone 480 U.S. at 484-85.
87. See id. at 488-93 (citing to Pennsylvania Coal, Agins, and Miller v. Schocne, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)). The Court stated: "[We have] repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely
affect real property interests." Id. at 489 n.18.
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necessary."' Adherence to this rule was particularly important in
takings cases, the Court said, because it has traditionally evaluated
takings claims on an ad hoc, fact specific basis.89 The Court dis-
cussed both the strong public interest in regulating strip-mining of
coal, and the fact that the statute did not deprive the coal companies
of all economically viable use of their land." Again, Hodel plainly
did not adopt a categorical rule as claimed by Justice Scalia in Lucas.
The Court's creation of the new categorical rule in Lucas clearly
constitutes judicial activism. The Court expands a constitutional right
and badly distorts precedent. As a practical matter, however, the rule
by itself probably will not revolutionize takings jurisprudence. Even
when an owner is deprived of all economically viable use of her
property, to recover she must also demonstrate that her title does not
already contain the restriction imposed on the property.9' Thus, if
local nuisance law already proscribes a particular use of property, the
state need not compensate an owner when it enacts an ordinance
imposing a similar restriction." In addition, the owner must
demonstrate that the regulation renders the property valueless.93 As
the Court recognizes in Lucas, such cases will be "relatively rare."94
Indeed, state courts can avoid the new Lucas rule simply by finding
that the regulated property retains some residual economic value.
Perhaps realizing that the new rule might be too easily circumvent-
ed, Justice Scalia invited the lower courts to define the relevant parcel
of property so as to make it easier to find a compensable total taking.
He stated:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economi-
cally feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule
does not make clear the "property interest" against which the loss
of value is to be measured. When, for example, a regulation
requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural
state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in
which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial
use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the
owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a
whole .... The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's
88. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 294-95.
89. Id. at 295.
90. Id. at 268-69, 279-80, 296-97.
91. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (claiming that
property owners should expect occasions where state power will restrict use of property).
92. Id. at 1028-30.
93. Id. at 1016.
94. Id. at 1018.
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law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law
has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular
interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges
a diminution in (or elimination of) value.95
Lower courts might rely upon this language to find many more
compensable takings. As John E. Fee notes, "If the relevant property
interest.., is defined narrowly enough, as for example, only those
rights that have been regulated away, then a taking will always have
occurred" and compensation will be required for any regulation of
land.96
While Justice Scalia does not suggest that the Court means to go
this far, he ignores much case law in suggesting that the issue is an
open one. In fact, the issue was fairly well-settled. In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court held:
"Taking"jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole ....
Similarly, in Andrus v. Allard," the Court held that "where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one
'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety."99 Whether the lower courts will acceptJustice
Scalia's invitation to consider the issue anew is not yet clear."0 For
95. Id. at 1016-17 n.7. The Court goes on to state that it could avoid this difficult issue in
Lucas because the state trial court found that the regulation left the beachfront lots without
economic value. Id.
96. John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1535, 1536 (1994).
97. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
98. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
99. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496-98 (1987) (relying on Penn Central and Andrus to reject claim
that regulation requiring plaintiffs to leave 50% of their coal in place amounted to total taking
of coal left in place).
100. The lower courts appear to be responding cautiously. Several courts have refused to
treat a partial taking of property as a total taking of the part regulated. See, eg., Stephenson v.
United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 63, 69-70 (1994) (finding that flooding of property may constitute
taking if it permanently impairs usefulness of property); Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.
City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1073-74 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (holding that taking of small units
of property does not violate Fifth Amendment because property must be viewed in its aggregate
form); Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 261 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (stating that two year moratorium that denies owner all economic use of property is not
categorical taking under Fifth Amendment). But see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171, 1179-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (treating 12.5 acre portion of 250 acre parcel as separate
unit and ordering compensation).
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our purposes, it is enough to note that for a court to state that settled
law is unsettled is as activist as it is to assert that precedent establishes
a rule that it does not establish. In both ways, Justice Scalia and the
other Justices joining his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council have engaged in judicial activism.
II. BOYLE V. UNITED TECHNOLOGmS CORP.
Lucas made new law when it extended the reach of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. But at least it made new law in an
area where the Supreme Court traditionally has played a paramount
role. The Court has a duty to interpret the Constitution. 10' More-
over, the judiciary is the primary means for enforcement of constitu-
tional rights.0 2
The federal courts create common law in different ways, some of
which are at least as controversial as creating new constitutional rights.
Although no general federal common law exists, 03 an ever-growing
body of specialized federal common law has emerged. 14 Judge
HenryJ. Friendly has identified several techniques that courts use to
create common law including: "spontaneous generation as in the
cases of government contracts or interstate controversies, implication
of a private federal cause of action from a statute providing other
sanctions, construing a jurisdictional grant as a command to fashion
federal law, and the normal judicial filling of statutory interstices."'0"
The fourth of these techniques, the courts filling in statutory
interstices, is probably the least controversial because it is unavoidable.
Legislators simply cannot anticipate all questions about the meaning
The Supreme Court may have recognized the danger posed by the Lucas language. In
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993), the
Court appeared to reaffirm the traditional standards as set forth in Penn Central, Andrus, and
Keystone Id. at 2290. The facts of ConcretePipewere very different, however, than cases involving
partial takings of real property. In Concrete Pipe, the plaintiff claimed that it was denied
procedural due process byan arbitration decision imposing a "withdrawal liability" when plaintiff
withdrew from a multiemployer pension plan. Id. at 2270. Plaintiff also claimed that its
"property" was taken without just compensation. Id. at 2290. The Court rejected plaintiff's
attempt "to shoehorn its claim" into a Lucas total taking by asserting that "'[t]he property of
[plaintiff] which is taken, is taken in its entirety."' Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner). It remains
to be seen how the Court will rule when the takings claim is not so far-fetched.
101. SeeMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,327 (1819) (claiming thatSupreme
Court has "ultimate power" to decide constitutional questions).
102. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (explaining duty of federal courts to
protect rights created by Constitution) (citing, inter alia, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
103. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
104. See HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise ofErie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 405 (1964).
105. Id. at 421.
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and application of statutes.' The other three techniques, however,
have been very controversial. 7
"Spontaneous generation" is a diplomatic way of saying that a court
makes up the law, either out of thin air, or by borrowing it from
whatever source it chooses. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp)s uses
this technique in adopting a new federal defense that a private
corporation can use to defend against a state tort claim.0 9 In the
process, the Court denied relief to the family of an airman who
suffered a "tragic and unnecessary death.""'
Boyle is an activist decision because the Court usurped Congress'
role in creating the new defense. Precedent did not support the
decision. Moreover, the new defense preempted previously applicable
state law. Boyle thus trampled on two principles that are sacred to
proponents ofjudicial restraint-separation of powers and federalism.
Essentially, there are things happening in Boyle to upset you, no
matter what your political persuasion."'
106. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights
in the Federal Courts, 38 HAS'INGS LJ. 665, 717-18 (1987) (reasoning that judges may be better
suited to determine appropriate remedies in particular cases).
107. The third technique, construing ajurisdictional grant as a command to fashion federal
law, was employed in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court
construed the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, that gave district
courts subject matter jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor union, as a command to fashion a body of substantive law governing enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 450-51. In dissentJustice Frankfurter fumed that the
Court gave the jurisdictional provision an "occult content." 1d. at 461 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). He criticized the Court for not seeing the separation of powers problem. Id. at 465
(Frankfurter, J. dissenting). He wrote:
The Court, however, sees no problem of "judicial power" in casting upon the federal
courts, with no guides except "judicial inventiveness," the task of applying a whole
industrial code that is as yet in the bosom of thejudiciary. There are severe limits on
"judicial inventiveness" even for the most imaginative judges. The law is not a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky," and it cannot be drawn from there like nitrogen
from the air.
Id. (FrankfurterJ., dissenting).
Several Justices have strongly criticized the traditional standards for implication of private
rights of action from statutes as violating separation of powers principles. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 395-409 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor). According to this
view, Congress alone has the power to create private rights of action. It is undemocratic for
judges to do so because that circumvents the majoritarian political process. See Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (claiming that judicial
creation of causes of action "denigrates the democratic process"). It also impermissibly extends
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to disputes that Congress has not assigned
to the courts. Id. at 745-46 (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
109. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504, 511-13 (1988).
110. Id. at 515 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
111. For scholarly discussions of Bole and its implications, see Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P.
Gillette, The Government ContractorDefense: ContractualAllocation of Public Risk 77 VA. L. REV. 257
(1991); Michael D. Green & Richard A. Matasar, The Supreme Court and the Products Liability Crisis:
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Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy.'
12
The facts are as follows. David Boyle, a marine helicopter pilot,
drowned when his helicopter crashed in the Atlantic Ocean during a
training exercise."' His father brought a diversity action in federal
district court against Sikorsky Helicopter."' The senior Mr. Boyle
made two claims under Virginia tort law. First, he alleged that
Sikorsky had defectively repaired the helicopter's automatic flight
control system, which then malfunctioned and caused the crash."
5
Second, he alleged that Sikorsky improperly designed an escape
hatch." '6 The hatch opened out, instead of in, thus making it
impossible to open against outside water pressure."' In addition,
the handle of the hatch was obstructed by other equipment.
18
A jury awarded a general verdict of $725,000 in favor of Mr.
Boyle." 9 The court of appeals reversed and directed entry of
judgment for Sikorsky.120 As to the first claim, the court held that
Mr. Boyle had failed to satisfy his burden under Virginia tort law of
showing that the repair work was done by Sikorsky, rather than the
Navy.'2 ' As to the second claim, the court applied a new federal
common law defense for military contractors.'22 Under this defense,
liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.1ss
The court held that Sikorsky satisfied these requirements. 24
Lesonsfrm Boyle s Government ContractorDefense, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 637 (1990); Carole A. Loftin,
Note, Expansion of the Government Contractor Defense: Applying Boyle to Vaccine Manufacturer, 70
TEX. L REv. 1261 (1992).
112. Boye, 487 U.S. at 501. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
l at 515, 531.
113. 1& at 502.
114. IL
115. Il. at 503.
116. Id
117. 1&
118. 1&
119. 1L
120. IL
121. AL
122. Id (relying on Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986)). The Fourth Circuit
created the new defense in Tozeron May 27, 1986, the same day it decided Boyle. Tozer, 792 F.2d
at 403; Boyle 792 F.2d 413, 413 (4th Cir. 1986).
123. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
124. IL
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The issue in Boyle was whether, in the absence of legislation by
Congress, it was appropriate for the federal court to create the
defense, rather than simply using Virginia tort law to determine
liability."z Boyle thus raises both separation of powers and federal-
ism concerns. Congress, rather than the courts, usually legislates
substantive rights and duties, and under the Erie doctrine, state law
generally'governs tort claims and defenses. 2 Justice Scalia does not
address these concerns head on. Instead, he casts the issue as one of
federal court preemption of state law.12 While this does not avoid
the separation of powers and federalism concerns, it makes one thing
very clear. Because preemption extinguishes state law, the plaintiff in
the next case cannot avoid Boyle by proceeding in state court. The
state court would be obliged to apply the new federal defense. 28
Justice Scalia announced two requirements for court-ordered
preemption of state law. First, the field of activity must involve a
"uniquely federal interest,"129 and second, there must be either a
"significant conflict" between the federal interest and the operation
of state law or the application of state law would frustrate the
objective of federal legislation."s Justice Scalia admits that the
Court seldom agrees to preempt state law.' He cites only two
situations in which the Court has done so. These situations involve
the obligations and rights of the United States under its contracts
1 3 2
and the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course
of their duty.33 In both situations, the Court has found sufficiently
important federal interests to create a body of federal common law
and displace state law.
Boyle is plainly distinguishable. Boyle does not involve the obliga-
tions or rights of the United States under its contracts. No federal
125. Id. at 504.
126. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
127. See BoyI4 487 U.S. at 504.
128. This result would not be as clear if the Court had cast the issue as an Erie choice of law
question, and then chosen to apply federal common law rather than state law. In that instance,
a state court in a subsequent case might not feel compelled to make the same choice,
particularly if different facts made the balance of federal and state interests come out differently.
Once preemption occurs there is no balancing left to do because federal law occupies the field.
129. Boyl, 487 U.S. at 507 (noting that determination that area involves "uniquely federal
interest" is necessary but not sufficient reason for displacing state law).
130. Id. at 507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) and
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979), respectively).
131. Id. at 504-05.
132. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592 (1973) (holding that
land acquisition agreement authorized by Act of Congress and to which United States is party
is to be governed by federal law).
133. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988) (holding that negligent conduct by
federal employees during employment is absolutely immune from state-law tort liability).
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contract is at issue in the case. Nor did Mr. Boyle sue any federal
officials. Boyle is a tort action by one private party against another.
Undeterred, Justice Scalia also asserts that suits against government
contractors implicate "uniquely federal interests.""s  He states,
"The imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly
affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will
decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or
it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will
be directly affected."" Despite Justice Scalia's attempt to disguise
it, the "uniquely federal interest" here can be expressed in one word:
money.
Once Justice Scalia asserted the federal interest, it became clear
that there was a conflict between that interest and the operation of
state law."3 6 If usual state tort principles apply, the military contrac-
tor will be held liable for its wrongdoing. 7 The contractor may
then pass the extra costs on to the government by charging higher
prices."s Thus, Justice Scalia concludes that "state law which holds
Government contractors liable for design defects in military equip-
ment does in some circumstances present a 'significant conflict' with
federal policy and must be displaced.""3 9
The Court's analysis is reminiscent of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc.,"4 a diversity case familiar to most first-year law
students as an important decision in the development of the modern
Erie doctrine. In Byrd, the Court adopted a three-part balancing test
for deciding Erie choice of law issues.' 4 ' First, a federal court is to
assess whether the state rule is "bound up with the definition of the
rights and obligations of the parties,"'42 or is instead merely "a form
and mode" of enforcing state law. This inquiry is appropriate for
134. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505-06.
135. I. at 507.
136. M at 512.
137. 1&
138. Id at 507.
139. Id
140. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
141. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958); Byrd was a
welcome retreat from the rigid outcome determination test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945). York held that an issue was "substantive," and thus state law should apply under
Eie, if application of federal rather than state law would significantly affect the result of a case.
Id. at 109-10. Because practically any legal rule has the potential to affect the outcome of a case,
York, to some extent, endangered uniform application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in federal courts. JOHNJ. COUND ET AL, CMVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (6th ed.
1993).
142. Byrd, 356 U.S. at, 536.
143. Id. (citing York, 326 U.S. at 108).
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deciding how important the state rule is to the state."' Second, the
court is to determine whether there are important countervailing
federal interests that would be compromised if state law is ap-
plied. 5  Third, the court is to assess whether applying federal
rather than state law will change the outcome of the case." If it
will, this factor supports application of state law. 47
The link between Byrd and Boyle may seem tenuous at first glance
because Justice Scalia does an incomplete job of applying the Byrd
balancing test in Boyle. He directly addresses only one of the three
factors, namely, the strong federal interest in a rule that will give
protection to military contractors." By implication, however, the
Court decides that Virginia's interest does not outweigh the federal
interest. The state interest, which Justice Brennan mentions in his
dissent, is not hard to identify.' Virginia wishes to protect its
citizens from harm, and the immunity the Court creates "contravenes
the basis tenet that individuals be held accountable for their wrongful
conduct.""5 Justice Scalia does not discuss the third Byrd factor,
144. PerhapsJustice Brennan, the author of Byrd, was trying to express the same concerns
thatJustice Harlan raised in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), when he said:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or
a federal rule, whether substantive or procedural, is to stay close to basic principles by
inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.
Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
145. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38.
146. Id. at 536-37.
147. Id. at 537-40.
148. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
149. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Virginia tort law would have allowed
compensation for Boyle's tragic and unnecessary death).
150. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). There is irony here because
Justice Scalia's incomplete Byrdbalancing mirrorsJustice Brennan's truncated balancing in Byrd
itself. In Byrd, the choice of law issue was whether ajudge or ajury should decide whether the
petitioner was a statutory employee within the meaning of the state Workers' Compensation Act
and thus obliged to accept compensation rather than sue in court. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 527-28.
State law required ajudge to decide the issue; federal common law required the jury to decide.
Id. at 533-34. Justice Brennan, in finding a strong federal interest for having the jury decide the
question, stated: "An essential characteristic of [the federaljudicial] system is the manner in
which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and,
under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions
of disputed questions of fact to thejury." Id. at 537.
Justice Brennan was unable to discover the obvious and strong state interest in having ajudge
decide. Plainly, ifjuries determine the statutory employee issue along with the merits of a case,
there is a strong likelihood that their opinion on the merits would color their decision on the
coverage issue. For example, pretend you are on ajury. A 55-year-old father of eight has been
blinded in an industrial accident due to the gross negligence of his employer, a large
corporation. You must decide whether the plaintiff was a statutory employee. If he was, you
must dismiss the case and the plaintiff will be awarded $400 a week for 60 weeks. On the other
hand, if you decide he was not a statutory employee, you may award the plaintiff $5,000,000.
Clearly, leaving the coverage question to the jury might endanger South Carolina's workers'
compensation law. In assessing the state's interest in having ajudge decide the issue, Justice
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perhaps because it does not support the conclusion he wants to reach.
The third factor favors application of state law because application of
federal law will change the outcome in many cases.' 5' In fairness to
Justice Scalia, however, this factor has become less important over the
years. 15 2
By creating a new defense that preempts state law, Boyle plainly
compromises federalism concerns underlying the Erie doctrine. As
Justice Brennan points out, the sweep of the Court's lawmaking at the
expense of state law is breathtaking:
[The new defense] applies not only to military equipment like the
CH-53D helicopter, but (so far as I can tell) to any made-to-order
gadget that the Federal Government might purchase after preview-
ing plans-from NASA's Challenger space shuttle to the Postal
Service's old mail cars. The contractor may invoke the defense in
suits brought not only by military personnel like Lt. Boyle, or
Government employees, but by anyone injured by a Government
contractor's negligent design .... It applies even if the Govern-
ment has not intentionally sacrificed safety for other interests like
speed or efficiency, and, indeed, even if the equipment is not of a
type that is typically considered dangerous; thus, the contractor who
designs a Government building can invoke the defense when the
elevator cable snaps or the walls collapse. And the defense is
invocable regardless of how blatant or easily remedied the defect,
so long as the contractor missed it and the specifications approved
by the Government, however unreasonably dangerous, were
"reasonably precise."'
Brennan examined an opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court that did not express this
interest. l at 535. By looking only in a place where the state interest was not expressed,
Justice Brennan concluded that the state interest was slight. Id. at 536. The South Carolina rule
was merely "a form and mode of enforcing the immunity and not a rule intended to be bound
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties." l (citation omitted).
Justice Scalia's treatment of the state interest in BoyleandJustice Brennan's treatment of the
state interest in Byrd dramatically demonstrate the shortcoming of balancing tests that weigh
several subjective factors. Such tests give judges enormous discretion to reach the result they
desire based on personal or political considerations.
151. In Boyle it was unclear whether the military contractor defense would have changed the
outcome. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions that judgment be
entered for the contractor. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413,415-16 (4th Cir.
1986), vacateA 487 U.S. 500 (1988). But, the Supreme Court was uncertain as to precisely what
the court of appeals had decided. Boyle 487 U.S. at 514. If the court of appeals decided on the
record before it that no reasonable jury could rule for Boyle under a properly formulated
defense, then its decision was correct. I& If the court of appeals assessed on its own whether
the defense was established, this was erroneous. Id The court instead should have remanded
to allow ajury to decide the question. Id.
152. SeeStewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (failing to mention "outcome
determinative" test); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965) ("'Outcome-determination'
analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman.") (citing Byrd 356 U.S. at 537).
153. Boyle 487 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The breadth of the new defense also makes the Court's disregard of
separation of powers principles particularly striking. AsJustice Stevens
notes in his dissenting opinion, the Court should defer to Congress
when it is asked "to create an entirely new doctrine"154 that involves
"a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of
a massive governmental program."55 Moreover, on six separate
occasions, Congress declined to enact legislation creating a special
defense for military contractors or providing indemnification for civil
judgments.'56 This suggests that Congress did not want military
contractors to have a special defense. While congressional inaction
is not always a reliable indicator of congressional intent,'-" there
seems to be a good reason why Congress would not want to enact the
legislation-the Boyle defense removes a strong incentive for govern-
ment contractors to design and manufacture equipment carefully.15 8
Boyle is thus an activist decision in several ways. The Court plainly
invaded the province of the states and of Congress when it created
the military contractor defense. It also ignored precedent, leaving the
courts to struggle with the scope of the new defense. 5 9
HI. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
United States v. Lopez is another striking example ofjudicial activism.
Lopez held that Congress' enactment of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 199011 exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.' The decision departs from nearly sixty years of
precedent Indeed, prior authority flatly contradicts virtually every
material assertion in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion1 62 Thus, not
154. Id. at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. See i at 515 n.1 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (listing legislation that Congress has refused
to pass for government contractors).
157. SeeSchweikerv. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 440 (1988) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (noting that
in act where Congress failed to include remedial scheme for improper denial of Social Security
disability benefits, congressional inaction was poor indicator of congressional intent).
158. One can push this argument too far, of course. Bidding for government contracts is
competitive. If a product is low quality, the contractor will lose business in the future.
159. The lower courts are divided on whether the Boye defense should extend to nonmilitary
contractors. For a listing of the cases pro and con, see Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117,
1119 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (1994) (forbidding "any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that [he] knows... is a school zone").
161. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
162. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court and was joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 1625.
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surprisinglyJustice Stevens chides the Court for "the radical character
of [its] holding.""
The Constitution states that "[t]he Congress shall have Power...
[t] o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."3" In Gibbons v. Ogden,'
ChiefJustice Marshall defined this power very broadly, stating that it
encompasses not only regulation of interstate traffic or the interstate
buying and selling of goods, but any "intercourse... between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches."" Congress may "prescribe
the rule[s] by which commerce is to be governed."167 In addition,
the power is plenary; it is "complete in itself, [and] may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and [it] acknowledges no limitations, other than
are prescribed in the constitution.""
In the years following Gibbons, the Court had few occasions to
consider the scope of Congress' affirmative power to regulate
commerce." The Court instead considered the validity of state
laws that burdened or discriminated against interstate commerce. 70
Congress' power was challenged, however, when it began to regulate
national economic life in the late 1800s and early 1900S.171 Deci-
sions at that time departed from the broad view of Gibbons. 72 The
Court held that activities such as production,'73 manufacturing, 174
and mining7" were local and that therefore Congress could not
163. I& at 1651 (StevensJ., dissenting). Lqaus has already occasioned scholarly commentary.
See Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L REv. 533-831 (1995).
164. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cf. 3.
165. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
166. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
167. Id. at 196.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995) (noting that after Gibbons, Court
rarely addressed extent of Congress' power).
170. SeeWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) ("During this period there was perhaps
little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, and the influence of the
Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost wholly from its operation
as a restraint upon the powers of the states.").
171. See Wckard, 317 U.S. at 121-22 (noting that after Congress' enactment of Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887 and Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890, Supreme Court gave narrow scope
to power of Congress).
172. See id. at 121 (detailing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
173. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20, 24 (1888) (noting that no distinction is more
popular or more clearly expressed "in economic and political literature, than that between
manufacture and commerce," and thatwhile manufacturing transforms raw materials into usable
form, commerce constitutes buying, selling, and transportation of manufactured product).
174. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds to
manufacture, and is not part of it.").
175. SeeHammerv. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251,272 (1918) (explaining that making goods and
mining coal do not constitute commerce, despite fact that these things are later shipped or used
in interstate commerce).
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regulate them under the Commerce Clause.17 6 Some decisions held
that Congress could regulate activities affecting commerce directly,
but could not regulate activities affecting commerce indirectly. 77
The cataclysmic economic turmoil of the 1930s swept these distinc-
tions away as Congress, using the Commerce Clause, enacted a tidal
wave of legislation to rescue the country from the Great Depres-
sion." The Court's cramped Commerce Clause jurisprudence
threatened economic recovery.Y17 After some initial hesitation, 18°
the Court adopted a much broader view of the commerce power."8
Several cases explicitly rejected both the distinction between
commerce and production, mining, or manufacturing 82 and the
distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce.183 The
Court held that Congress may regulate activity that affects commerce,
even if that activity by itself appears wholly local or intrastate and its
effect on commerce is indirect" 84 As the Court stated in Wickard v.
176. See National Labor Relations Bd. (NLRB) v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
34 (1937) (providing extensive list of cases that found activity to be local and thus beyond
Congress' power to regulate under Commerce Clause).
177. See e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (holding that statute
regulating coal prices and hours and wages of miners had only "secondary and indirect" effect
on interstate commerce); A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935) (distinguishing between direct and indirect effect on interstate commerce as necessary
to determine whether federal government may regulate intrastate commerce and noting that
distinction must be made on case-by-case basis); E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16 (noting that
conspiracies to control domestic enterprise only restrain external trade indirectly).
178. See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1023-24 (1977)
(providing brief summary of major enactments during 1930s).
179. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTiTUTONAL LAW 115-22 (12th ed. 1991) (stating thatCourt's
narrow interpretation of commerce power led to invalidation of important New Deal legislation);
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "ourt-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. Cr.
REv. 347,356-57 (stating thatSupreme Court's narrow construction of Commerce Clause in mid-
1930s placed New Deal laws in jeopardy and barred movement toward new legislation).
180. See, eg., Carter, 298 U.S. at 309 (invalidating legislation as exceeding Congress' power);
Schechler, 295 U.S. at 546 (same). These decisions provoked President's Roosevelt's plan to add
additionalJustices to the Supreme Court. GUNTHER, supra note 179, at 119, 122; Leuchtenburg,
supra note 179, at 358-59, 375-79.
181. See generally Robert L Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59
HARV. L REV. 645 (1946) (tracing expansion of commerce power).
182. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (stating that federal power is not
determined by subject of regulation); NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 40 (1937)
(noting that fact that employees were engaged in production is not determinative of whether
Commerce Clause applies).
183. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1971) (emphasizing that "activity...
may still . .. be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce, and this [is] irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'" (quoting Wckard, 317 U.S. at 125)).
184. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981)
(holding that if Congress rationally determined that activity affects interstate commerce,
Congress can regulate activity); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) (holding that
purely intrastate activity may be regulated by Congress when it affects commerce "among the
States or with foreign nations"); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942) ("The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce
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Filburn "[Qjuestions of the power of Congress are not to be
decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling
force to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and
foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question
upon interstate commerce."186
Moreover, the Court made clear that Congress could regulate
noncommercial activity as long as the activity affected interstate
commerce. 8  In short, "[i]t is the effect upon commerce, not the
source of the injury, which is the criterion."188 In addition, the
Court held that Congress could regulate a class of activities that
affected commerce and that individuals who violated the regulations
could be sanctioned without any specific proof that their actions
affected commerce. 89  Finally, the Court adopted a very deferential
standard of review. The Court would uphold legislation if Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that a regulated activity affected
interstate commerce,'9 regardless of whether Congress made
specific factual findings demonstrating the connection.'
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce
... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end.");
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (holding that Congress has power to regulate
intrastate commerce affecting interstate commerce).
185. 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
186. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942); see also WightwoodDairy, 315 U.S. at 121
(recognizing that one need not be engaged in interstate commerce in order to be subject to
regulation).
187. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57 (holding that Congress can regulate loan-sharking
under Commerce Clause because activity affects interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) ("That Congress was legislating against moral
wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid."); Wickard 317 U.S. at 125
("But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce .... ").
188. NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937) (citations omitted).
189. See Hodel 452 U.S. at 277 (stating that wholly intrastate activity can be regulated where
activity, combined with similar activity by others, affects interstate commerce); Perez, 402 U.S. at
152 (holding that when class of activities is properly regulated, particular intrastate activity may
be regulated without proof that it affected commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304-05 (1964) (holding that absence of direct evidence connecting discriminatory restaurant
service with flow of food in interstate commerce was not a crucial matter).
190. See Hode, 452 U.S. at 276 (holding that Congress rationally determined that regulating
surface coal mining was necessary to protect interstate commerce from its adverse effects);
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304 (determining that Congress had rational basis for finding racial
discrimination in restaurants had adverse effect on flow of interstate commerce); Heart ofAtlanta
Mote, 379 U.S. at 261-62 (holding that Congress reasonably determined that racial discrimina-
tion has disruptive effect on commerce and thus Congress, under Commerce Clause, could
prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accommodation).
191. SeePera, 402 U.S. at 156-57 ("Congress need [not) make particularized findings in order
to legislate."); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299 (noting that "no formal findings were made, which
of course are not necessary").
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This was the law when the Court decided United States v. Lopez.
Alfonso Lopez, Jr., came to school in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a
handgun and bullets."9 2 When school authorities discovered the
gun, Lopez was arrested and charged with violation of state law.193
The next day the federal government filed additional charges under
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal
crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place
that the individual knows... is a school zone."'14 Lopez moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the statute exceeded Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause.'95 The district court denied
the motion and Lopez was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced
to six months in prison and two years supervised release.' 96 The
court of appeals, however, accepted Lopez's Commerce Clause
defense and reversed.'97 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,9 8
and affirmed.'
The Court begins its opinion by briefly, and quite accurately,
tracing the doctrinal developments in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, pausing only to mention that there are some limits on
Congress' commerce power." The Court accepted the categoriza-
tion of Commerce Clause cases20 1 set forth in Perez v. United
States.212 Under this framework, Congress may regulate (1) the "use
of the channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress
deems are being misused;" (2) the "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce, or "persons or things in commerce;" and (3) activities
"affecting" interstate commerce. °3 The Lopez opinion becomes very
strained, however, when the Court turns to consider Congress' power
192. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
193. Id.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
195. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
199. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
200. Id. at 1628-29. The Court also notes, fairly enough, that the rational basis test
contemplates that in some instances the Court may find that Congress did not have a rational
basis for concluding that a regulated activity affected interstate commerce. Id. at 1629 n.2.
201. Id. at 1629.
202. 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
203. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). Both the ChiefJustice in the majority
opinion andJustice Breyer in dissent in Lopez note that the Court has sometimes used the word
"substantially" and sometimes not used it in defining the third category. 115 S. Ct. at 1630; id.
at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Lopez, the majority opts to require a substantial effect on
commerce, while Justice Breyer would require only a "significant" effect. Compare id. at 1630
(majority opinion) with id. at 1657 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The ChiefJustice seems to
be paddling upstream against a strong current.
Chief Justice Rehnquist admits that the Court has upheld "a wide
variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity
where [it has] concluded that the activity substantially affected
interstate commerce." 204 The Chief Justice cites five cases in sup-
port of this proposition: "Examples include the regulation of
intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortionate credit transactions,
restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, inns and hotels
catering to interstate guests, and production and consumption of
home-grown wheat." 5 This body of precedent poses a formidable
problem for the Court because guns in schools affect interstate
commerce at least as much as the activities regulated in these other
cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist deals with the cases by attempting to
distinguish Wickard v. Filburn and wholly ignoring the others.0 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist's attempt to distinguish Wickard is uncon-
vincing on the facts and flatly contradicts existing law. Wickard upheld
economic regulation of local, intrastate activity that had very little
effect on interstate commerce. Filburn was an Ohio farmer.20 7
Each year he grew a small crop of winter wheat.28 He sold a
portion, fed part to poultry and livestock, used some to make flour for
home consumption, and kept the rest for seed. 209 Congress enacted
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938210 to control the amount of
wheat grown in the United States in order to avoid surpluses and
shortages and to help maintain consistent prices. 1 Filburn was
allotted only 11.9 acres for 1941, but he planted twenty-three
acres.212 Ultimately, a penalty was imposed.213  Filburn refused to
pay, and sued to enjoin enforcement of the penalty.214
In a portion of the Wickard opinion quoted by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court explained that Filburn's activity affected
interstate commerce because the variability and volume of home-
grown wheat, if left unregulated, would have a substantial influence
204. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
205. Id at 1630 (citing Hode4 Pere; Kazenbach, Heart of Atlanta Mol, and Wickard) (citations
omitted).
206. See id.
207. Id. at 114.
208. I&
209. Id.
210. 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1994).
211. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115.
212. I& at 114.
213. Id at 115.
214. Id at 113-15.
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on price and market conditions: "'[I]f we assume that it is never
marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would
otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market."'2 15 Thus,
home-grown wheat affected interstate commerce by competing with
wheat in commerce. 6
The ChiefJustice distinguishes Wickard in Lopez on the ground that
the Agricultural Adjustment Act regulated economic activity, while the
Gun-Free School Zones Act "is a criminal statute that by its tens has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enter-
prise. 21 7 The Act is not a part of a larger regulation of economic
activity that, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.1
This analysis has several problems. First, Wickard did not necessarily
view Filbum's activity as commerce. In a portion of the Wickard
opinion quoted earlier by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court states:
"But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce ... ."211 Second, as Wickard and later cases make clear,
there is no requirement that the activity regulated be commercial or
economic activity.22° The Court has stated, "It is the effect upon
commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion."221
Third, guns in schools affect commerce as much as growing wheat for
home consumption. As Justice Breyer explains in his dissenting
opinion, "the problem of guns in schools is widespread and extremely
serious."222 School violence significantly interferes with educa-
tion.2  In the modem economy, education is essential to suc-
cess. 224  Moreover, a badly educated populace cannot compete
effectively with workers from other countries. 21 Why "is it not...
215. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995) (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128).
216. Lo 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
217. Id at 1630-31.
218. Id.
219. Wikard, 317 U.S. at 125.
220. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussing congressional regulation of
noncommercial activity).
221. NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937) (citing Second Employers'
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1911)). See Louis H. Pollack, Symposium: Foreword: Reflections
on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533,547 (1995) ("From a constitutional perspective,
the important question should be whether the activity sought to be regulated has a substantial
effect on commerce-in other words, a substantial 'economic' effect-not whether the activity
is itself 'economic.'").
222. Loper, 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
223. Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
224. Id. at 1659-60 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
225. I&
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obvious," Justice Breyer asks, "that a widespread, serious, and
substantial physical threat to teaching and learning also substantially
threatens the commerce to which that teaching and learning is
inextricably tied?"226
In addition, the activities regulated in the other cases that Chief
Justice Rehnquist cites, but does not discuss, have no greater effect on
interstate commerce than guns in schools. The effect is different in
each of the cases, but not necessarily more substantial than in Lopez.
The statute in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n
regulated intrastate strip mining.227  Strip mining destroys or
diminishes the value of the land for both commercial and noncom-
mercial purposes."' It also causes water pollution, which may affect
other states.229  Strip mining's effect on interstate commerce,
however, is no more direct than the effect of guns in schools. In
addition, the statute upheld in Perez2 is very similar to the statute
overturned in Lopez. The Consumer Credit Protection Act outlawed
loan-sharking.2 l Loan sharks typically lend money to individuals at
very high-interest rates, and use violence or threats of violence as a
method of collection. 2 Perez was convicted of a wholly intrastate
crime. He loaned money to the owner of a new butcher shop, and
then made very ugly threats to try to get back the loan plus substantial
additional moneys."3 The Court upheld the law on the theory that
extortionate credit transactions help fund organized crime.2"
Because organized crime affects interstate and foreign commerce,
Congress could regulate loan-sharking." 5 Distinguishing Perez from
Lopez is difficult. Why do threats to a local businessman have more
effect on interstate commerce than carrying a gun in school? In
addition, loan-sharking in the aggregate probably does not affect
interstate commerce more substantially than the overall incidence of
guns in schools.
226. Id. at 1660 (BreyerJ., dissenting); see ato id at 1651 (StevensJ., dissenting) (agreeing
with Justice Breyer).
227. Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268-72 (1981)
(analyzing Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328).
228. Id. at 277.
229. Id. at 279-80.
230. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,147 (1971) (analyzing Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1994).
232. Perec, 402 U.S. at 147-48.
233. Id at 148.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 149-50, 154-57.
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Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United Stat s6 and Katzenbach v.
McClunil7 upheld provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
require hotels and restaurants to provide lodging" and meals 39
to African Americans. In both cases, the Court held that local racial
discrimination affected interstate commerce because it deterred blacks
from traveling interstate.2" While the impact on interstate com-
merce may be more direct than in Lopez, it does not seem more
substantial.
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's attempt to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial activity in defining congressional
power is unworkable. He acknowledges the problem: "Admittedly,
a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or
noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty."24
The problem is highlighted by Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
where he characterizes the activities regulated in Perez, Heart ofAtlanta,
and Katzenbach as commercial242 and the activity regulated in Lopez
as noncommercial.243 While threatening someone to get them to
repay a debt or turning a black person away from a restaurant or
motel because of their race may arguably be more "economic" or
"commercial" than possessing a gun in a school, the distinction is a
subtle one, particularly when the gun may be used to rob fellow
students. In addition, the commercial-noncommercial distinction is
reminiscent of the content-based or subject matter distinctions that
the Court used in an earlier era and abandoned as unworkable.
244
It is unlikely that the new distinction will work any better than the old
distinctions between commerce and manufacturing, production, or
mining.24
236. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
237. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
238. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).
239. Katzenbach v. McLung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964).
240. Heart of Atlanta Motel 379 U.S. at 252-53; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300.
241. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995). Professor Donald H. Regan has
called ChiefJustice Rehnquist's attempt to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
activities that affect commerce "an unsupported and ill-considered gloss on an already misguided
theory." See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commercial Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 555 (1995).
242. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. d at 1638, 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing cases rejecting distinction
between commerce and production, mining, and manufacturing).
245. Justice Kennedy admits that the content-based distinctions proved unworkable, Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1635 (KennedyJ., concurring), and states that the "lesson" applicable in the Lopez
case "is the imprecision of content-based boundaries used without more to define the limits of
the Commerce Clause." Id at 1637 (KennedyJ., concurring).
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ChiefJustice Rehnquist next argues that the Gun-Free School Zones
Act "contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce."24  As an example of such a provision, he
cites a former federal statute that made it a crime for a felon to
"'receiv[e], posses[s], or transpor[t] in commerce or affecting
commerce ... any firearm."'247  There are at least two major
problems with this argument. First, the Chief Justice may be
confusing his categories. As noted above, the Court lists three
categories of activities that Congress may regulate under the com-
merce power.248 If a gun moves in interstate commerce, Congress
clearly can regulate it under the second category of "persons or things
[that move] in interstate commerce."249 Activities that affect inter-
state commerce constitute a separate, third category,2 ° and the
Court has not required that regulated items in this category cross state
lines." 1 Second, and perhaps more serious, the Chief Justice simply
ignores the well-established line of cases holding that Congress may
regulate a class of activities affecting commerce. 2 The government
may then sanction individuals who violate the regulations without any
specific proof that the individual's actions affected interstate com-
merce.25 1 Thus, as long as guns in schools in the aggregate affect
commerce, it should not matter that the statute did not require the
government to prove that Lopez's possession of a gun affected
commerce.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist next cites the lack of specific congressional
findings describing the effect of guns in schools on interstate
commerce as a ground for invalidating the statute.' The Chief
Justice again contradicts well-established precedent in using the
absence of findings in this way. Past cases asked only whether
Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activities affect
246. I& at 1631.
247. I& (quoting former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)).
248. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (stating that Congress may regulate use
of channels of interstate commerce, persons or things that move in commerce, and activities
affecting commerce).
249. Lope, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
250. Id. at 1629-30; Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
251. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 305 (1981)
(upholding regulation of strip-mined coal without any requirement that coal move in interstate
commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (upholding regulation of home-grown
wheat that never left farm).
252. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing line of cases).
253. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing liability of class member without
proof action affected commerce).
254. Lop&, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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commerce, and did not require Congress to make formal find-
ings. 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist says that he agrees with this stan-
dard 6 but then tries to avoid it by saying "to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the
naked eye, they are lacking here." 7 Although the effect may not
be visible to the "naked eye," it should be apparent to an open mind,
particularly when both the government andJustice Breyer explain the
effect.
The Court then goes on to discuss the effect of guns in schools on
interstate commerce, but does not come back to the findings
issue. 9 ' Instead, it makes a "parade of horribles" argument. If we
acceptJustice Breyer's argument, says the Court, placing any limits on
congressional power to regulate American life under the Commerce
Clause would become impossible." ° The Court contends, for
example, that Justice Breyer's argument would also pennit direct
regulation of local schools and of family life."' The Court may be
correct. School curricula and family child-rearing practices arguably
affect the national economy as substantially as do guns in schools.
Nonetheless, the Court's decision to draw the line where it does
inevitably appears arbitrary and is inconsistent with precedent. The
Court recognizes the line-drawing problem.262 But it concludes that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act impermissibly erodes the distinction
between "what is truly national and what is truly local. 21
Lopez may simply reflect the Court's alarm at the increasing
federalization of state criminal law. Chief Justice Rehnquist argues
forcefully that the States possess the primary authority for enforcing
the criminal law: "When Congress criminalizes conduct already
denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a 'change in the
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.' 264
255. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis analysis of
Commerce Clause regulation).
256. Lope; 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
257. Id. at 1632.
258. See iUL at 1659-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining firearm possession and its effect
on interstate commerce). But see id. at 1632-33 (criticizing Justice Breyer's argument that
firearm possession threatens interstate commerce).
259. Id. at 1632.
260. Id at 1633-34.
261. Id.
262. See id. (admitting imprecision of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
263. I.
264. Id. at 1631 n.3 (quoting United States v. Emnons, 410 U.S. 396,411-12 (1973) (quoting
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971))).
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The federalization of state criminal law is alarming.2" But should
the Court try to reverse the trend, or leave the matter to Congress?
The Court also may be using a bludgeon rather than a scalpel to
accomplish its goal. The commerce power, as interpreted over the
last two generations, underlies a broad range of legislation. Much of
it has little to do with criminal law. Is it wise to unsettle sixty years of
understandings and expectations concerning such an important
constitutional provision simply to keep some gun possession cases out
of federal court?" Reasonable minds may differ as to whether the
Court's decision is correct, but it is plain that the activist Rehnquist
Court takes matters into its own hands in Lopez.
267
CONCLUSION
This Article contends that the current Supreme Court is extremely
activist. Together, Lucas, Boyle, and Lopez clearly support this
contention. Lucas created a new rule of law, and in the process, badly
distorted precedent. The Court also reached out to hear the case
even though it may not have been ripe for review. Boyle usurped
Congress' role by legislating a new federal contractor defense to state
tort claims. Precedent did not support the decision. Moreover, the
new defense preempted previously applicable state law. Boyle thus
offended both separation of powers and federalism principles. Lopez
held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause. The decision departs from
265. The practice has been very controversial. Critics charge that it invades the province of
the states, involves the federal government in crimes ofscant federal concern, and overburdens
the federal courts. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define
the Proper Limits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction, 46 HASTINs LJ. 979, 983-96 (1995) (discussing
impact of expansion offederal criminaljurisdiction); Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated at Birth:
A Comparative History of the Civil and Criminal Arising UnderJurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some
Proposals for Change 19 VT. L. REV. 673, 772 (1995) (discussing criticism of congressional
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction).
266. Professor DeborahJones Merritt assesses the treatment of Lopez by the lower courts in
Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 712-28 (1995).
267. See 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (Thomas,J., concurring) (noting that Court is "drifting" from
original understanding of Commerce Clause). Justice Thomas' extraordinary concurring
opinion makes the majority opinion look like a model ofjudicial restraint. Justice Thomas wants
to turn the clock back to the nineteenth century. He would adopt the old distinction between
mining, manufacture, and production, on the one hand, and commerce on the other. Id. at
1643. He also would abandon the substantial effects test "as but an innovation of the 20th
century," id. at 1648, that "appears to grant Congress a police power over the Nation," id. at
1649. In addition, Thomas rejects the "class of activities" standard because he believes it allows
Congress to regulate "whole categories of activities that are not themselves either 'interstate' or
'commerce.'" Id. at 1650. Justice Thomas believes that the Court's "wrong turn" was its
"dramatic departure in the 1930s from a century and a half of precedent." Id. at 1649.
Accordingly, he concludes that the Court must modify its Commerce Clausejurisprudence. Id
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nearly sixty years of precedent, and badly unsettles the understandings
of an important constitutional provision.
This Article simply sought to demonstrate the Court's new activism,
and not to explore the legitimacy or wisdom of this course. As the
Court continues to render what appear to be overtly political, result-
oriented decisions, one wonders whether some more neutral
principles of adjudication would not be preferable. Perhaps Herbert
Wechsler was right when he urged the Court to render decisions that
rest "on reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved."2"
268. HerbertWechsler, Toward Neutral P ips of Contitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(1959).
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